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FOREWORD
THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS
OF CONTRACT DESIGN
Mitu Gulati*
Robert E. Scott**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Last fall we gave a faculty workshop at the Hofstra University
School of Law on an early version of our book manuscript, The Three
and a Half Minute Transaction. The resulting debate was lively and the
discussion ranged over a wide variety of topics. The end result, much to
our delight, was that the editors of the Hofstra Law Review suggested a
symposium where they would invite a group of eminent scholars and
practitioners to react to the manuscript. The hope was that those
reactions would generate a further debate akin to the one we had at the
workshop. Given the exceptional group of scholars and experts in the
field that the editors of the Hofstra Law Review have assembled, they
have achieved that goal. And we are pleased that they asked us also to
contribute a short introduction to their symposium that would provide
readers with some background on the book manuscript.
The story in the book begins with what, by all rights, should have
been a minor legal skirmish. It took place roughly a decade ago, in
September 2000, in an obscure commercial court in Brussels. A U.S.
hedge fund, Elliott Associates, L.P. (“Elliott”), was attempting to recover
on debt on which the Republic of Peru had defaulted some years before
during the Latin American debt crisis.1 Elliott, a so-called “vulture
* Professor, Duke Law School.
** McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92, ¶ 5 (Court of Appeal of Brussels,
8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000) (unofficial translation on file with the Hofstra Law Review); M ITU
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fund,” specialized in buying unpaid debt obligations on the secondary
markets at a deep discount and then seeking to recover in full by using
innovative litigation techniques devised by a crack team of lawyers
(backed by private investigators and investment specialists).2 For over a
hundred years, creditors had found it nearly impossible to successfully
sue a sovereign state for unpaid debt obligations. Elliott was attempting
to change the traditional rules of the game. In September 2000, they
succeeded in doing precisely that.3
Given the difficulties associated with trying to sue and recover
directly from a sovereign, Elliott attempted instead to pursue the
financial intermediary that Peru was using to pay those creditors who
had entered into its officially sanctioned restructuring agreement.4 If
asked about Elliott’s chances of success at the time, most sophisticated
observers would likely have put them at close to zero. But a combination
of unusual events, including a court that was unfamiliar with sovereign
litigation and sovereign debt contracts, a brewing corruption scandal
involving the Peruvian president, and Elliott finding a contract provision
whose meaning no one else seemed to know, combined to result in a
victory for Elliott. In the end, this ex parte ruling became one of the most
momentous decisions in global finance. Our book is about the impact of
that case, and, in particular, what did and did not happen in the decade
following.
At the center of the case was the interpretation of a three-line
clause—the pari passu clause (which means, literally, “in equal step”)—
that has been in cross-border financial contracts for at least a century.5
One might imagine that a clause of this vintage—one that is found in
practically every cross-border sovereign bond issuance—would be
among the most well understood of the boilerplate terms that are part of
the modern sovereign debt contract. Yet, this was a provision that almost
no one understood. In essence, pari passu was a boilerplate contract
provision that most parties treated as ornamentation.6 All that changed,
however, when the local commercial court in Brussels issued a
preliminary injunction based on Elliot’s interpretation of the clause as an
inter-creditor agreement to share equally in any payments by the
GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND
THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 20) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review).
2. See Vulture Funds Prey on Poorest Countries, INDEPEN. CATHOLIC NEWS,
http://www.indcatholicnews.com/news.php?viewStory=10139 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
3. Elliott Assocs., ¶ 8; GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20).
4. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20 & n.12).
5. See id. (manuscript at 20-24) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Id. (manuscript at 21).
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sovereign to its unsecured creditors. That interpretation resulted in Elliott
recovering somewhere in the vicinity of $58 million on a debt claim that
it had purchased for around $11 million.7 Industry experts and insiders
were apoplectic at what they saw as an outrageous decision. More
importantly, the dominant view of the lawyers who were experts in
sovereign debt transactions was that, whatever it meant, pari passu was
not a term that required creditors who had consented to a restructuring
agreement to share their payments ratably with non-consenting creditors.
Such an interpretation would essentially permit any hold out creditor to
disrupt restructuring agreements in the future.
In view of what was supposedly an erroneous interpretation, one
might have expected the elite practicing bar to react immediately and
decisively. Theory tells us that the transactional lawyers responsible for
negotiating sovereign debt contracts would have quickly clarified their
forms so as to discredit the heretical interpretation of this boilerplate
provision before the heresy could spread and gain traction. That did not
happen. Ten years later, almost all sovereign debt contracts still have this
contract provision, often on the front page of the sales document, and
essentially unchanged in form and language from the clause that was the
subject of litigation in Brussels.8
In our book, we attempt to unpack the puzzle of why these financial
contracts were not revised despite the on-going risk of other courts or
adjudicative bodies adopting the same destabilizing interpretation. But
we also tell a story of forgetfulness. It is a story of how a remarkably
unconfiding contractual provision was introduced into international
financial contracts over a hundred years ago, was absorbed into the
lumpish boilerplate of such contracts, and then came to be replicated,
thousands upon thousands of times, even while the knowledge of its
origin and purpose insensibly faded from the minds of its remote
drafters. If anything, the increase in the popularity of this clause in
international financial contracts seems to have been inversely related to
market understandings of its meaning. As the clause became more
widely used over the past century, shared understanding of its intended
meaning actually diminished.9
This is also a story about the organic life form known as a standard
commercial contract and how such documents pass relatively untouched
through the hands of generations of lawyers, much like a seed can pass
unharmed through the intestinal tract of a bird. The story can be told

7. Id. (manuscript at 24-25).
8. Id. (manuscript at 75, 79-80 & 80 tbl.1).
9. Id. (manuscript at 86-91).
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from the standpoint of basic human psychology—novelty sparks
curiosity, repetition stupefies it. Or it can be told from the perspective of
a legal profession in which new lawyers are expected to learn the lore of
their craft from their elders in a tutorial, master-apprentice system that
no longer exists in most major law firms. Or the tale can be brought
down to the individual lawyer working on a financial document late at
night, and who briefly wonders about the significance of a pari passu
representation in her agreement, only to pass on, comforted by the
thought that someone at the firm must know why it is there; the
document is, after all, the firm’s standard form for this type of deal.
Finally there is the question: If the pari passu clause could have
lain dormant, unchallenged for over a century in cross-border financial
contracts, how many other boilerplate clauses might similarly have
outlived the memory of their origins and purpose, making them prime
candidates for creative interpretations by highly motivated litigants?
Conventional wisdom in the world of contract theory is that
sophisticated lawyers, especially those who get paid large amounts of
money to service clients in the financial sector, are fast moving,
innovative, and quick to fix any problems that their clients might
encounter. If a court makes an error of interpretation, according to this
story, lawyers will soon respond by revising their contracts to make sure
that the problem does not occur again. Yet numerous scholars over the
years have observed that reality does not match theory.10 Financial
contracts, in even the most sophisticated sectors, are often slow to
change (in the parlance of the trade they are “sticky”).11 But why? Both
the academic literature and the lore of practicing lawyers have posited a
number of theories.12 But scholars have had little success in developing
the data that permit a more definitive answer.
The pari passu case from Brussels interested us because it had the
potential to unlock a mystery that had long bothered legal scholars in the
financial contracts field. Why was it that these sophisticated and highly
paid lawyers, working at the most elite firms in the world, failed to alter
a contract term that not only posed a litigation risk to their clients, but
that no one understood?
The failure to revise a contract term that, owing to an aberrant
interpretation, now carried a non-trivial litigation risk was inconsistent
both with the theoretical models of how sophisticated contract drafters
behaved and with the dynamic model of case law serving as the basis for

10. See id. (manuscript at 17-18 & 18 n.6).
11. See id. (manuscript at 18).
12. Id. (manuscript at ch. III, VI).

2011]

FOREWORD

5

contract drafting and innovation. We assumed there had to be a rational
explanation for the fact that “the dog didn’t bark.” Our speculation was
that we would find some form of “agency problem” driving the
phenomenon: lawyers were failing to represent their clients’ interests
adequately owing to recognizable conflicts of interest. Perhaps, for
example, lawyers were reluctant to admit that they had failed on past
deals to exert appropriate efforts on behalf of their clients to remove the
litigation risk that ultimately materialized. Whether owing to this or
other causes, we believed that we would be able to solve the puzzle
quickly. Surely, it would only take a few months to find answers to our
questions and to publish the results.
We began by gathering information along two different dimensions.
First, we collected data on the contracts themselves—to see whether
what we had perceived by casual observation (that the contract
provisions had not been revised to fix the offending provision) was
actually the case for a large data set.13 Second, we asked a sample of the
senior New York lawyers who worked on sovereign debt contracts
whether we could speak to them about our puzzle.14 In our original
research plan, we proposed to interview twenty-five to thirty lawyers in
New York and to examine fifty to seventy-five sovereign debt contracts
over the period 2000–2005.15
Our early optimism about finding an answer turned out to be
misplaced. No coherent answers emerged from either the first set of
contracts or the interviews.16 Instead of a straightforward agency
problem or other market failure explanation, these hard-nosed Wall
Street lawyers told us stories about rituals, talismans, alchemy, the
search for the Holy Grail, and Zeus. Frustrated, we assumed that we
simply had not talked to enough people or the right people or looked at
enough sovereign debt contracts. As we write this piece, more than six
years after we began, we have examined over 1500 sovereign debt
contracts, covering the period 1820–2010, and conducted more than 200
interviews.17 As we kept unpacking the story, it became more interesting,
even as a straightforward conflict of interest hypothesis proved ever
more elusive. No single agency cost explanation emerged from the data;
at least not in a fashion that we could assert with confidence. To be sure,
we recognized that the lawyers we talked to would be unselfconscious
about the array of possible conflicts that might explain the failure to
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. (manuscript at 11).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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amend or eliminate a troublesome clause, and also would be quite
ignorant of any theoretical explanations for the faithlessness of agents.
Nevertheless, the explanations we were given for why a troublesome
clause was allowed to remain in subsequent contracts were both diverse
and conflicting. Moreover, we determined from our research that these
explanations often rested on myths that were based on quite
unsupportable factual premises.18
Over time, a messy but more consistent hypothesis began to
emerge: there are many overlapping sources of agency costs in
contemporary big firm law practice—at least law practice of the sort
represented by the firms that draft these contracts and thus have had to
grapple with the pari passu issue. The myths that we were told can be
best understood as ways in which the lawyers were able to deflect what
would otherwise be obvious failures to correct errors in the formulation
of historic boilerplate. “Three and a half minutes” is one explanation that
was candidly offered to us by a lawyer who sought to explain the
tradeoff between the time it took to “draft a new contract” and the effort
costs of redesigning boilerplate that was widely used and had been part
of the standard form contract for many years.19 But “three and a half
minutes” is also a metaphor for a business model that relies on herd
behavior, fails to provide incentives for innovation, and thus rises and
falls on volume-based, cookie-cutter transactions.20
To be sure, we find that in cases where the litigation risk is
perceived as acute, firms adapted to the risk by redesigning sovereign
debt contracts (often by adding new terms rather than correcting errors in
existing terms). But our evidence suggests that where the risk is real but
not acute, lawyers rely on the herd and on their myths—the returns to the
firm in terms of volume transactions outweigh the present value of the
risk to them.21 This is despite the fact that a social planner seeking to
maximize the joint interests of lawyers and their clients would likely
choose a different business model. In short, we conclude that social
welfare is less than it would be under a different regime even though the
private benefits of volume transactions over careful design may explain
the firm behavior that we see.
The contributors to the symposium22 come from a range of
perspectives. And those perspectives have helped push the ideas in our
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Review.

Id. (manuscript at ch. VIII).
Id. (manuscript at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
The symposium pieces referenced infra are published in Vol. 40, No. 1 of the Hofstra Law
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manuscript well beyond our starting point. It goes without saying that we
are grateful to both them and the editors of the Hofstra Law Review.
The pieces in this symposium divide into two sets. The first set of
pieces takes an institutional perspective. The focus is on the modern law
firm and why its contract production model may be malfunctioning. The
second group of pieces is from scholars and practitioners more interested
in the sovereign debt markets themselves. These pieces, unsurprisingly,
focus on the implications of our findings for that market which, even as
we write this, is facing one of its worst crises ever in the Eurozone.
II.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The late Larry Ribstein was a constant source of encouragement
during the six years of our research for the book. Larry was a prolific
and wide-ranging scholar; in recent years he had been particularly
interested in the business model of the large law firm, one that he
perceived to be unduly hindered by antiquated laws such as the
restrictions on law firms being able to raise equity capital. In the piece
that he wrote before his untimely passing, he asked the question of why
law firms innovate so little. In theory, after all, law firms should always
want to do more (more work means higher billings, and that is what law
firms want). If lawyers are choosing not to do certain types of work,
therefore, there must be some structural feature of the market that is
deterring them from doing this work. Among those structural features is
the difficulty that lawyers have in capturing the returns from
innovations, particularly contract innovations. There are also other
structural features of law firms that deter innovation, such as the rules
that forbid equity ownership by outsiders. Larry suggested that these
restrictions on financing deter long-term research and development.
Stewart Macaulay and Preston Torbert, a legendary scholar and an
eminent practitioner, respectively, while coming at our manuscript from
different directions, end up asking similar questions. This is perhaps not
surprising, since Macaulay and Torbert are both interested in the nitty
gritty of how contracts are produced at the ground level and what
function they serve, according to those who are producing and using
them. Both of them suggest, independently, that the “three and a half
minute” model of contract production, under current fee structures, is not
sustainable. If eminent law firms are doing little more than reproducing
contract documents from prior deals, without doing much to correct
errors in prior drafts, let alone innovating and improving contracts, then
it will not be long before boilerplate contract drafting gets outsourced.
One does not, after all, need to pay Wall Street lawyer fees to have some

8
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junior associate cut and paste a document from a prior deal. That process
can occur at a lower cost in Bangalore or Manila, with what will
probably be a higher rate of error correction. Perhaps the future of the
elite U.S. or U.K. law firm is less leverage, higher quality, and greater
outsourcing of routine tasks.
Of the four institutional voices, Barak Richman is perhaps the most
optimistic about the modern law firm. His criticism is reserved for what
he sees as an antiquated model that contract scholars use to understand
the production of boilerplate contracts. Contract production in the
modern law firm, according to Richman, is akin to the assembly-line
production of a car in Detroit. It is mass production, not Savile Row
tailoring. The traditional principal-agent model where a lawyer is
tailoring solutions for an individual client does not fit the context of
boilerplate financial instruments. Precisely because boilerplate contracts
are mass produced (hence, “three and a half minutes”), they are
necessarily going to fail specific client needs. The model to apply, if one
wants to understand modern contract production, should be one built on
insights taken from organizational economics, Richman suggests.
III.

THE SOVEREIGN DEBT PERSPECTIVE

The last four pieces are by scholars and practitioners grounded in
the sovereign debt market itself.
Mark Wright, one of the best-known economists writing about
sovereign debt, makes at least two significant points in his piece. First,
he suggests that the fact that lawyers have been unwilling to alter the
pari passu terms may mean that they and their clients prefer the existing
formulation. They may not have appreciated the outcome in the Brussels
case, where Elliott obtained a disproportionate recovery, but that does
nothing to undermine their preference for a rule mandating pari passu
treatment. Put differently, the actions of the lawyers in retaining the
clause are a better indicator of true preferences of market actors than
their rhetoric. Second, Wright asks whether, as an independent matter, it
really is so outrageous for creditors to ask for a clause that both promises
them equal treatment vis-à-vis other unsecured creditors and also allows
them a meaningful remedy if those rights are not respected.
Wright is asking exactly the right questions, we think. In terms of
the first point, it was the disjunction between what lawyers were saying
(that the Brussels interpretation of pari passu was outrageous) and what
they were doing (failing to alter the pari passu clauses in their own
contracts to negate the outrageous interpretation) that interested us in the
first place. The second point also raises interesting issues. What we see
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as a result of the Brussels case is that sovereign contracts can, in fact, be
designed in ways that make it possible to sue and enforce against the
sovereign. Contract lawyers, one might think, would take the Brussels
case and the success of Elliott as an impetus to design better mechanisms
to enable enforcement against misbehaving sovereign debtors. After all,
ex ante, that should produce a lower cost of capital. Indeed, from an ex
ante perspective, the inability to bring meaningful legal action against
defaulting sovereigns is almost certainly the central economic problem
in the sovereign debt market. Yet, there seems to be little attempt to
design new contract provisions that would meaningfully improve
enforcement; not even after the impetus of Elliott’s success.
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Robert Cohen, an eminent scholar
and practitioner, respectively, take up positions at opposite ends of the
spectrum in terms of the meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign
debt instruments. Olivares-Caminal, formerly the U.N. Conference on
Trade Development expert on sovereign debt, takes the official position
of condemning the interpretation given in Brussels. Cohen, one of the
primary lawyers for Elliott in the pari passu litigation, reiterates the
basic point that his clients have made repeatedly: If pari passu does not
mean pro rata payment in the sovereign context, what else can it
possibly mean?
Finally, we have a piece by one of the legends of the sovereign debt
world, Philip Wood. Wood does not rehash the arguments over what
pari passu means in the sovereign context. His interest is in the broader
notion of pari passu promises and how, even in the non-sovereign
context, this notion is confusing and often violated. Contracting parties
seem to want the symbolism that comes with a promise of pari passu
treatment, even when they do not wish to have it operate as a strict
contractual provision. And that begs the question of why the notion of
pari passu treatment shows up so often in both contracts and statutes.
We are delighted that these eminent scholars and practitioners have
engaged our manuscript with such care and attention. They have surely
moved the discussion far beyond what we envisioned originally. Our
thanks also to Allana Grinshteyn and her fellow editors of the Hofstra
Law Review for having worked tirelessly in identifying and persuading
the participants in this issue to contribute their thoughts and in putting
these diverse perspectives together.

